Financial Integration Intensifies New Vulnerabilities: Brazil in the Global Financial Crisis by Kaltenbrunner, Annina & Pablo Painceira, Juan
The contents of this Development Viewpoint reflect the views 
of the author(s) and not necessarily those of CDPR or SOAS.
www. soas.ac.uk/cdpr
Telephone: +44 (0)207 898 4496
Centre for Development Policy and Research 
SOAS, University of London
Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London , WC1H  0XG, UK











2 0 0 6 q1 2 0 0 6 q2 2 0 0 6 q3 2 0 0 6 q4 2 0 0 7 q1 2 0 0 7 q2 2 0 0 7 q3 2 0 0 7 q4 2 0 0 8 q1 2 0 0 8 q2 2 0 0 8 q3 2 0 0 8 q4
Financial Integration Intensifies New Vulnerabilities: 
Brazil in the Global Financial Crisis 
by Annina Kaltenbrunner and Juan Pablo Painceira, Economics Department, SOAS
Recently, Brazil’s adoption of an international transactions tax has 
focused economic debate on the increased exposure of emerging 
economies to the instability of international financial markets. 
This Development Viewpoint concentrates on the role of financial 
integration and central bank policies in intensifying the instability 
of capital flows into Brazil and the volatility of its exchange rate (see 
Kaltenbrunner and Painceira 2009). 
Late in 2008, Brazil experienced one of the largest exchange-rate 
depreciations in the world as short-term speculative capital flooded 
out of the economy. In late 2009, as this Viewpoint is being written, the 
conditions appear to be building up towards a similar exchange-rate 
outcome as sizeable short-term capital inflows have caused increasing 
exchange-rate appreciation.
What is noteworthy about the large sudden flight of capital in late 2008 
is that it had little connection to Brazil’s ‘economic fundamentals’, such 
as its current-account balance, its fiscal balance or its public-sector debt. 
Instead, it was linked directly to deteriorating conditions in international 
financial markets. 
A Flood of Capital Inflows
Previous to the depreciation of the Brazilian Real in late 2008, foreign 
capital had poured into the Brazilian economy, seeking out high returns 
on short-term, highly liquid financial assets. See the Figure on foreign 
portfolio investment in Brazilian equities and debt securities. This surge 
intensified dramatically in 2007 and remained at high levels throughout 
much of 2008, during the build-up to the crisis.
A major requirement of these portfolio investors was that they could 
quickly convert their newly acquired Brazilian wealth into dollar-
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denominated assets. Meanwhile, they were benefiting from Brazil’s 
high real rate of interest and speculating on further appreciation of its 
exchange rate. But if conditions turned for the worse, they were ideally 
positioned to quickly spirit their capital out of the country.
This dramatic inflow of speculative capital was contributing precisely 
to intensifying pressure on the Real to appreciate even further (just as 
similar capital inflows are doing now). Because of rising losses in global 
financial markets in late 2008 (which were unrelated, in fact, to domestic 
economic conditions in Brazil), financial investors began liquidating their 
Brazilian financial assets, precipitating a severe crisis whose foundations 
they had been primarily responsible for creating.
Sources of Rising Vulnerability
One of the first signs of Brazil’s rising external financial vulnerability 
was the increase in foreign investment in its stock market. Foreign 
participation in Initial Public Offerings on the national stock exchange 
(Bovespa) rose, for example, from 48% of the total in 2005 to 76% in 
2007. 
Brazilian equities were one of the most actively traded in emerging 
markets. But such stock purchases resulted mainly from ‘carry-trade’ 
operations, in which investors exchanged weakening-dollar assets 
for short-term Brazilian equities, whose Real values were increasing in 
relative terms.
Another rising source of external financial vulnerability was the 
substantial increase in the US-dollar denominated liabilities of Brazil’s 
domestic banking system. The deficit on the banks’ net foreign position 
(their foreign assets minus their foreign liabilities) more than doubled 
between September 2006 and September 2008, i.e., from US$ -20 billion 
Figure 1: Foreign Portfolio Investment (US$ billions)
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to about US$ -45 billion.
Another manifestation of Brazil’s increased external vulnerability was 
the rising participation of foreign investors in a highly liquid derivatives 
market concentrated in very short-term maturities. For example, 
while the daily trading volume in foreign exchange (FX) derivatives 
was about R$ 30 billion during May-June 2008, it leapt to R$ 41 billion 
during September-October 2008. Meanwhile, the share of international 
institutional investors in FX derivatives rose significantly, namely, from 
about 5% in 2003 to about 23% in 2008.
By the summer of 2008, Brazil’s external financial vulnerability had 
reached dangerously elevated levels. First, the accumulated stock of 
foreign investment in the country had become huge. And, second, this 
investment had become more concentrated in very liquid financial 
assets. All that was missing was a negative external shock that would 
precipitate a rapid exit of capital.
This trigger was the rapidly rising level of panic of international 
investors during the summer of 2008 as the frightening dimensions of 
the unfolding financial crisis became acutely apparent. The Brazilian 
Real began to plunge in value starting the first week of August and 
depreciated by more than 60% thereafter. 
This depreciation was part of a general trend in emerging markets as 
investors rapidly sold off their emerging-economy financial assets and 
retreated back into the ‘safe haven’ of dollar-denominated assets. In the 
last quarter of 2008 alone, the capital flight recorded on Brazil’s financial 
account reached US$ 22 billion.
The Role of the Central Bank
What role has the Brazilian central bank played in shaping the 
conditions for vulnerability that we describe above? Paradoxically, 
central-bank policies, both leading up to the crisis and during it, have 
tended to amplify Brazil’s external vulnerability. 
During the period of rising capital inflows and exchange-rate 
appreciation, the central bank tried to mop up excess liquidity by selling 
short-term government securities (through ‘sterilisation’). But as global 
financial conditions worsened during 2008, the average maturity of 
these securities shortened dramatically (to less than 30 working days by 
September), and their average interest rate rose (approaching the very 
high domestic overnight rate). These developments increased the room 
for manoeuvre of domestic banks, i.e., enabling them to rapidly shift the
composition of their assets and liabilities during the height of the crisis. 
The domestic banks that bought government securities were able to 
use these assets to borrow more foreign capital—namely, increase their 
foreign liabilities. This meant that the broad money aggregate, M2, 
which includes banks’ liabilities, actually rose. Inadvertently, the central 
bank had boosted, in effect, the banks’ liquidity and their foreign-
exchange exposure.
When the global crisis sent shock waves through the Brazilian financial 
system beginning in September 2008, the central bank reversed course 
and began to flood the economy with foreign-exchange liquidity 
(e.g., through foreign-exchange spot sales, increasing loans to finance 
external trade and interventions in the derivatives market). This was 
intended to forestall a rapid depreciation of the Real. As a result, 
the total stock of foreign-currency liquidity supplied to the Brazilian 
economy between September 2008 and January 2009 rose to US$ 26 
billion.
Through such operations, the central bank not only expanded the 
liquidity available to the financial market but also reinforced the short-
term nature of financial positions. As it did before the crisis, the central 
bank supplied the market with very short-term securities, (such as 
‘repo operations’, many of them with an overnight maturity), allowing 
investors to quickly abandon domestic assets in favour of foreign assets 
during the crisis. 
Hence, the central bank had become an integral part, in fact, of the 
process of facilitating the exit of the massive pool of unstable ‘hot 
money’ that had accumulated in Brazil prior to the crisis.
Brazil’s increasing integration with international financial markets had 
left it gravely exposed to externally generated instability. At first, during 
the build-up to the crisis, the flood of short-term foreign capital served 
to substantially appreciate its exchange rate. Then when the global crisis 
hit with full force, Brazil’s huge exposure to short-term unstable foreign 
investment led to rapid depreciation of its currency and massive capital 
flight. 
Though central bank policies might have been intended to counteract 
such exchange-rate volatility, their ultimate impact, both before the 
crisis and during it, was to reinforce it by intensifying the economy’s 
vulnerability to oscillations in international financial markets.
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